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Rationalism in Science
DAVID STUMP
If rationalism is to be defined, in part, as the belief that at least some of our knowledge
of the world is gained by pure reason alone, prior to experience, then science, as the
main example of human knowledge, should be a focus of discussion in philosophical de-
bates over rationalism. Although the traditional characterization of modern philosophy
as a debate between the British empiricists and the continental rationalists that was sup-
erseded by Kant has been widely acknowledged to be problematic for various reasons,
recovering the scientific influences on modern philosophers will be the key to discus-
sion here. Descartes and Leibniz were scientists as much as they were philosophers,
and Locke explicitly claimed to be representing scientists. Hobbes, Berkeley, and Kant,
who, unlike Descartes and Leibniz, are classified purely as philosophers, also engaged
in scientific studies, albeit with mixed success. Furthermore, in both the early modern
and in later periods, scientists such as Newton, Boyle, Herschel, Helmholtz, Duhem,
Mach, Poincaré, and Einstein all wrote on philosophical topics. To a great extent, the
philosophical debate between rationalism and empiricism took place within science.
The fact that the philosophical debate over rationalism and empiricism followed in
the wake of the establishment of modern science does not seem accidental. The new
science was taken to be the best, if not the only way, to discover the true nature of the
world, most significantly expressed in laws of nature in mathematical form. Perhaps
some claims of the newness of modern science and of its overwhelming superiority to
scholasticism are simply overstated rhetoric, but nevertheless, both sides of the philo-
sophical debate over rationalism and empiricism embraced modern science. Since the
distinctive trait of modern science is taken to be its combination of experiment and the
application of reason, especially mathematics, to the study of nature, it may seem par-
adoxical that the philosophical debates over rationalism and empiricism should arise,
given that modern science could be viewed as the ideal compromise between rationalism
and empiricism. In fact, the roles of reason and the senses in knowledge and in the forma-
tion of ideas are at stake in the philosophical debates over rationalism and empiricism
precisely because of the inconsistent claims made about their roles in the new science.
These debates can be seen as having been born out of the methodological reflections
on the relative roles of experiment and reason in creating the success of the new science.
The rationalist claims that some part of scientific knowledge about the physical
world is a priori – known through reason or intellectual intuition – while the empiricist
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rationalism in science
claims that knowledge about things in the world can only be obtained through experi-
ence. Both sides accept the ability of the mind to formulate and to understand repre-
sentations of nature and acknowledge the role of perceptual knowledge in science and
in everyday experience, but empiricists claim that reason is limited to what Hume calls
the “relations of ideas,” that is, the defining of one term by means of another, or the
discovery of the logical consequences of propositions (Enquiry IV). It is important to
note that a rationalist need not be committed to a priori knowledge of the existence of
anything, nor of the properties of any individual object, but rather only to general
claims about the nature of things in the world. For example, a rationalist might claim
that geometry expresses the real nature of space and the things in it, so any triangle
(or even something that approximates to a triangle) in nature must have certain char-
acteristics that we can discover a priori. Once we know that a triangle is a three-sided
figure, we can use pure reason to show that the sum of the three angles of any triangle
must be equal to two right angles (Descartes 1984: 45; AT 64). Rational intuition is
claimed to tell us how the world must be, since the general principles and laws that the
rationalist claims to discover are not contingent facts.
The burden of proof for the rationalist is explaining what rational intuition is and
why we should think that it will reliably tell us something about the world. A consid-
eration of thought experiments that purport to give an a priori justification of claims
about the physical world will be part of the basis of this discussion. Even if thought
experiments seem to lead to reliable knowledge about the world, the rationalist cause
also carries the burden of explaining the overthrow by later science of various prin-
ciples that were claimed to be a priori, necessary, and known with certainty. A con-
sideration of some of the philosophical response to the development of non-Euclidean
geometries will be the basis of this discussion. The burden of proof for the empiricist
in this argument, especially after Kant, is to show how science can exist without any
a priori knowledge. While Kant limited reason and acknowledged that experience is
the main source of scientific knowledge, he also argued that there is a residual element
of a priori synthetic knowledge, what we might now call the theoretical elements of
a science, that cannot be eliminated. For example, Kant argued mathematics is both
a priori and synthetic, that is, it tells us more than Hume’s relations of ideas convey.
Since mathematics is clearly central to science, it becomes a major stumbling block to
the empiricist claim that there is no a priori element in science. This suggests that
a good way to investigate rationalism in science is to ask whether there are some
elements of science that are intractably a priori. Mathematics, a few fundamental
principles or laws of nature, and other theoretical elements of science seem to be good
candidates for a priori knowledge for which the empiricist will need to provide an
account. Thus, the focus of this chapter will be on a few illustrative examples of poten-
tially a priori sources of knowledge in science: thought experiments, mathematics, and
theory in science.
The New Experimental Science as a Challenge to Intuition
Although it is still a matter of controversy among historians of science, many now
say that there is much more continuity between early modern science and medieval
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scholasticism than the standard histories of the scientific revolution allow (Barker and
Ariew 1991; Duhem 1980; Martin 1991; Lindberg and Westman 1990; Freeland and
Corones 2000). The question of continuity is important here because the distinguish-
ing mark of modern science is often taken to be its empirical nature, despite the fact
that, as much as anyone, Descartes and Leibniz, the exemplary scientific rationalists,
defined themselves in opposition to scholasticism and in favor of the new science (e.g.,
see Garber 1992, 1995). Consider Bertolt Brecht’s Life of Galileo, a surprisingly influ-
ential history of the scientific revolution that is more fun and perhaps only slightly
more fictitious than some of the standard histories of science. Brecht’s Galileo dis-
proves Aristotle’s theory of why ice floats by performing a simple experiment, while
the characters of the mathematician and the philosopher refuse to look at the moons
of Jupiter through the telescope, insisting that a priori argument alone settles the ques-
tion of their existence (Brecht 1967: 63, 32). Empirical evidence proves that a priori
methods are bankrupt.
Of course, there are far more nuanced ways for advocates of modern science to
make the case that the scientific revolution marked a radical break from scholasticism.
Interpretation of the complex and comprehensive works of figures such as Galileo,
Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz in simple terms is difficult. As noted above, the develop-
ment of modern science is often viewed as the unification of mathematical methods
and experimental methods, embodied especially well in figures such as Galileo and
Newton. Advocates of this position seem to claim that rationalists do not take the role
of experimental science seriously enough, or indeed think that actually conducting an
experiment is superfluous. In the concluding section of the first study in the famous
Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science, James Bryant Conant remarks:
The development of experimental science in the seventeenth century was the consequence
of the combination of deductive reasoning with the cut-and-try type of experimentation.
Two great figures of this period who contributed to the study of pneumatics symbolize the
two traditions whose combination produced modern science. Blaise Pascal was primarily
a mathematician, Robert Boyle primarily an experimentalist . . . In Pascal’s treatise on
hydrostatics and his work on pneumatics it is hard to tell whether or not most of the
so-called experiments were ever performed. They may well have been intended rather as
pedagogic devices – as demonstrations that the reader performs in his imagination in
order better to understand the principles expounded . . .
Boyle in one of his discussions of hydrostatics (1666) gently pokes fun at Pascal for
having written of experiments that appeared impossible of execution . . . As an example of
some of the things that Pascal described that strained one’s credulity, Boyle refers to an
experiment in which a man sits 20 feet under water and places against his thigh a tube
that extends above the surface of the water. (Conant 1957: 59– 60)
In contrast to Pascal, Boyle set the standard for reporting complete results of experi-
ments, even when they seemed irrelevant and especially when they were negative. He
was also meticulous about providing detail so that experiments could be reproduced,
though the air pumps that he had built were beyond the technical resources of all but
a few elite centers of scientific research. In the history of science, whole areas of in-
quiry and knowledge sometimes depend on the invention of a new piece of equipment
to investigate nature. Boyle claimed that facts were exhibited in the air pump, but the
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experiments were very difficult to carry out. It took two strong men “divers hours” to
evacuate the chamber, it constantly leaked, and phenomena were open to multiple
interpretations (Conant 1957: 9). Granting that proper empirical investigation leads
reliably to scientific knowledge, we can consider here whether thought experiments
can also lead reliably to such knowledge.
Advocates of thought experiment sometimes claim that a successful thought experi-
ment provides us with genuine knowledge about the physical world by pure reason
alone. This has been called the “paradox of thought experiment” by Horowitz and
Massey (1991) and has also been recognized as a rationalist position (e.g., Sorensen
1992). As an antidote to Brecht, and to utilize a scientific thought experiment that
most commentators take to be convincing, we can consider Galileo’s refutation of
Aristotle’s law of free fall, not by dropping balls off of the Tower of Pisa, but rather
by an argument that appears in Discourse on Two New Sciences (Galilei 1974: 66ff.).
According to Aristotle, heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. Galileo asks us to
consider what will happen to the rate of fall of a heavier and a lighter object if they are
combined in various ways, assuming that objects do indeed fall in accordance with
Aristotle’s law. Consider putting the smaller object directly on top of the larger one
before dropping them. If the objects fall in accordance with Aristotle’s law, they should
separate and each fall at the speed at which they would have fallen if they were never
in contact. If the heavier object is put on top, however, it will push down on the
slower, smaller object, which in turn will act as a brake on the larger one. The result-
ing speed will be in between that of the two objects falling separately. If the objects are
connected, we can also imagine non-uniform results. If the connection is a flexible
chain, for example, the heavier object should fall faster at first, but then experience
drag from the slower-moving object chained to it. On the other hand, if there is a rigid
connection between the two objects, we might want to say that they together form a
new heavier object that will fall even faster. However, this situation is hardly different
from the case where the heavier object is simply pushing down on the lighter one,
without being connected at all. We have arrived at the apparently contradictory result
that the combination of two objects will sometimes fall faster than the heavier of the
original two alone, and sometimes fall slower. Galileo concludes that the way to avoid
this result is to give up Aristotle’s law. Indeed, he says that the natural conclusion to
draw from this thought experiment is that free fall always occurs at the same rate, no
matter what the weight of the object. If Galileo’s argument is correct, free fall must be
independent of weight, so (if we replace the term “weight” with “mass”) it would seem
that the modern law of free fall is not empirical at all. Furthermore, the law of free fall
would be necessary in a very strong sense because, if Galileo is right, it is the only
possible law of free fall. Contrast this law of nature to another law of nature that
governs the behavior of physical bodies: light travels at 186,000 miles per second and
we discovered that speed empirically. It seems natural to say that we might have
discovered that the speed of light was much faster or much slower.
One response that the empiricist might make to thought experiments is to claim,
like Mach, that thought experiments do not by themselves lead to knowledge about
the world – even successful thought experiments must be repeated physically. While
thought experiments might be useful as guides to research, pedagogy, etc., they are in
a strict sense superfluous (Sorensen 1992: 61–2). John Norton (1991) clarified this
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line of response by defending the view that thought experiments are arguments (cf.
Bishop 1999). In the philosophical debate between rationalists and empiricists, both
sides accept that genuine knowledge can be logically deduced from known premises.
Therefore, if the premises of a thought experiment are already known empirically,
they are unproblematic; if not, the advocate of the thought experiment must be claim-
ing that there can be a non-empirical source of knowledge about the physical world.
Whether the empiricist can be convincing would seem to depend on whether or not all
thought experiments can be seen as arguments, and that it is possible to obtain the
information resulting from the thought experiment in some empirical way.
Another response that the empiricist might make is to simply deny that the thought
experiment leads to the given conclusion. For example, Alexandre Koyré’s analysis of
Galileo’s thought experiment focuses on the issue of whether the connected bodies
form a new unitary object or not. According to Koyré, Galileo has not derived a con-
tradiction from Aristotle’s law of free fall, but rather has given one case where there is
a new single object that falls faster than the original heavier object and another case
where there are two separate objects that fall slower than the original heavier object
(Koyré 1968: 51). The question of whether or not a connection between the original
two objects makes it into a new unitary one is vexing. Perhaps we can agree that the
connection must be rigid, but how rigid? What if the distance between the two objects
was great? There is at least some ambiguity about what to call a single object here, but
perhaps not a contradiction, as Galileo claimed.
Dijksterhuis (1986: 327) rejects Stevin’s purported proof of the law of the inclined
plane in a very similar manner. Stevin’s argument depends on the assumption that
perpetual motion is not possible, even in an idealized, frictionless system. Since Stevin
has not justified his claim that perpetual motion is impossible in an idealized system,
Dijksterhuis refused to accept the validity of the argument. If an empiricist can show
that the thought experiment does not lead to the given conclusion, then there is no
risk of thought experiments being used to show that rationalism is true. Faulty argu-
ments do not show that thought experiments can lead to genuine knowledge of the
physical world.
Geometry and Intuition
As noted above, both rationalists and empiricists accept argument as a source of genu-
ine knowledge; that is, it can be logically deduced from known premises. However,
rationalists claim that some fundamental principles or laws of nature can be known a
priori by intellectual intuition, while empiricists claim that such principles must either
be definitions in disguise, like Hume’s relations of ideas, or else they must be justified
empirically. Intellectual intuition is understood as a kind of “grasping” by which we
recognize the truth of a proposition or understand the meaning of an idea. Descartes
spoke of the “natural light” by which we could understand “clear and distinct ideas”
and recognize their certainty. Propositions known by intellectual intuition are said to
be “self-evident,” that is, needing neither logical demonstration nor evidence gained
from sense experience. As such, they are taken to express necessity and to be known
with certainty, but not all claims of a priori knowledge seem certain and many have
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been shown to be false by later developments in science (Hahn 1933). This hardly
makes a priori claims look like candidates for reliable knowledge. Equally as problematic
for the rationalist as changes in supposedly certain and obvious principles, however, is
the fact that the rationalist cannot explain such a principle or convince someone who
does not understand it.
Kant tried to correct the use of reason in science by limiting its scope. Kantian
critical philosophy does not go beyond what it can legitimately prove. Many tradi-
tional philosophical issues are ruled out of court as unanswerable and many others
are left to empirical science to settle. Despite the limits that Kant set out and despite the
fact that Kant was deeply engaged with the Newtonian exact sciences of his time and
even produced some original scientific work, Kantian philosophy was also proven wrong
by later advances in science. The fall of Euclidean geometry from its place in Kant’s
philosophy is perhaps the most famous case of a former bit of necessary and certain
knowledge that became merely one of several alternatives that are perhaps not true at
all. Kant argued that Euclidean geometry is a true description of space (space as a
phenomenon, not as noumena) and that knowledge of space and, hence, knowledge of
Euclidean geometry, was a necessary precondition for the possibility of any science at
all. Kant had argued that our knowledge of Euclidean geometry is thus both a priori
and synthetic, and it is also certain because alternatives to Euclidean geometry are
impossible. To make a long story far too short, mathematicians first showed that
alternatives to Euclidean geometry were possible and physicists (especially Einstein)
next showed that the actual structure of space was not Euclidean.
Euclidean geometry has zero curvature, there is exactly one parallel to a given line
through a point outside that line, and the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is
equal to 180 degrees. Bolyai-Lobachevskii geometry has negative curvature, there is
more than one parallel to a given line through a point outside that line, and the sum of
the interior angles of a triangle is less than 180 degrees (how much less depends on
curvature). Riemannian geometry has positive curvature, there are no parallel lines,
and the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is greater than 180 degrees (how much
greater depends on curvature). Riemann went even further and developed general
coordinate systems that can describe spaces of variable curvature. After the accept-
ance of non-Euclidean geometries around 1870, Helmholtz directly challenged Kant’s
view of geometry (Helmholtz 1977a, 1977b; Nowak 1989).
Not all was lost for defenders of Kant, however. Even though Kant seemed to say
that only Euclidean geometry was possible, he could not have meant that other
geometries were logically inconsistent. One of the criteria that Kant put forward as a
definition of an “analytic” statement is that its negation leads to a contradiction. If
alternatives to Euclidean geometry were contradictory, they would have to be analytic
in Kant’s terms. But Kant thought that both geometry and arithmetic were synthetic,
that is, they are not merely built up from explicit definitions, but also require intuition
in a quite specific sense. Intuition is what allows us to construct figures and objects in
our minds. Thus, the neo-Kantian of the early twentieth century could maintain part
of Kant’s claims about intuition that leads to a priori knowledge of the world, despite
the mathematical challenge (Renouvier 1889, 1892).
Of course, the situation changed dramatically with Einstein’s General Theory of
Relativity, in which space (more precisely, space-time) has no fixed structure at all
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independent of the matter and energy distributed in it. The geometry of space is
determined empirically, not a priori, and far from being necessary, Euclidean geometry
is not even true. It is, of course, approximately true of small regions of space-time
and good enough for engineering, but so are all of the alternative metric geo-
metries. Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity had a tremendous impact on Schlick,
Carnap, and Reichenbach, the great founders of philosophy of science as we know
it today. All three wrote philosophical interpretations of Einstein’s Theory of
Relativity in the 1920s and 1930s, and developed their strictly empiricist philo-
sophy in response to the new physics (Carnap 1922; Schlick 1920; Reichenbach
1965, 1969).
Prior to the development of the General Theory of Relativity, Henri Poincaré had
extended Kant’s strategy of giving up one kind of a priori knowledge while maintaining
others, arguing that while arithmetic follows from a synthetic and a priori intuition of
the concept of whole number and of the principle of mathematical induction, our
intuition of the metric properties of bodies is completely empty. The issue to consider
here is how Poincaré came to view geometry and arithmetic so differently and whether
or not there can be a consistent criterion for accepting rational intuition in one area of
knowledge while rejecting it in others. Poincaré’s basic position on the role of intuition
in geometry is developed in an 1889 article on logic and intuition, and is repeated in
several places in his works (Poincaré 1889). Like Mach, he accepts the role of intuitive
arguments in pedagogy and in scientific discovery, in addition to its special synthetic
a priori role in the epistemology of arithmetic. Poincaré also recognizes the increasing
demand for rigor in mathematics. Crucial to this rigor is the idea that we must ferret
out all of our implicit assumptions, replacing them with explicit definition and strict
proof. For geometry especially, this work culminates in Hilbert’s Foundations of Geo-
metry, and in a review of this work, Poincaré agrees that rigor demands avoiding all
appeals to intuition:
Is the list of axioms complete, or have we let escape some that we apply unconsciously?
This is what we need to know. To find this out, we have one and only one criterion. We
must investigate whether or not the geometry is a logical consequence of the explicitly
stated axioms; that is to say, if these axioms, entrusted to a reasoning machine, could
produce the entire series of geometric propositions. If they can, we will be certain that we
have not forgotten anything, because our machine cannot function except according to
the rules of logic by which it was constructed. It does not know of this vague instinct that
we call intuition. (Poincaré 1902c: 269)1
Poincaré argues that geometry concerns only the properties that are common to all of
the alternative metric geometries. Since projective geometry studies the properties of
figures that are invariant under a group of projective transformations, groups alone
are fundamental:
The different ways in which a cube can be superposed upon itself, and the different ways
in which the roots of a certain equation may be interchanged, constitutes two isomorphic
groups. They differ in matter only. The mathematician should regard this difference as
superficial, and he should no more distinguish between these two groups than he should
between a cube of glass and a cube of metal . . . What we call geometry is nothing but the
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study of formal properties of a certain continuous group; so we may say, space is a group.
(Poincaré 1898: 40, 41)
Poincaré’s central argument for the elimination of metric intuition from geometry is
that geometric objects can be stipulatively defined from more fundamental objects. In
his early work, groups play this role, since all of the metric properties of geometries
can be expressed in the theory of continuous groups (Poincaré 1889: 129). Thus, part
of what had seemed to be a priori knowledge to Kantians can be seen to be “empty,” as
empiricists suggested.
There is a strong tradition in nineteenth-century mathematics of interpreting un-
known (or seemingly impossible) objects as combinations of known simples. This tra-
dition goes back at least to Hamilton’s geometric interpretation of complex numbers,
and continued in Beltrami and Klein’s early treatment of non-Euclidean geometries.
Poincaré follows tradition; however, there are limits to this process, and a synthetic
a priori element must be maintained in science, according to Poincaré. Thus, groups
maintain their status as innate concepts that are known a priori (Poincaré 1889;
Picard 1901), and our knowledge of arithmetic depends essentially on the principle of
mathematical induction and on the concept of number taken to be a synthetic a priori
element of science. Indeed, distancing himself from the “global conventionalism” of
Elouard Le Roy, Poincaré distinguishes three elements of science – a priori, conven-
tional, and empirical:
Here are three truths: (1) The principle of mathematical induction; (2) Euclid’s postulate;
(3) the physical law according to which phosphorus melts at 44° (cited by M. Le Roy).
These are said to be three disguised definitions: the first, that of the whole number; the
second, that of the straight line; the third, that of phosphorus. I grant it for the second;
I do not admit it for the other two. I must explain the reason for this apparent inconsist-
ency. First, we have seen that a definition is acceptable only on condition that it implies
no contradiction. We have shown likewise that for the first definition this demonstration
is impossible; on the other hand, we have just recalled that for the second Hilbert has
given a complete proof. As to the third, evidently it implies no contradiction. Does this
mean that the definition guarantees, as it should, the existence of the object defined? We
are here no longer in the mathematical sciences, but in the physical, and the word exist-
ence has no longer the same meaning. It no longer signifies absence of contradiction; it
means objective existence. (Poincaré 1920: 185– 6; 1913: 468)
Metric primitives can be explicitly defined in terms of more basic primitives and a
complete proof of the consistency of the metric geometries can be given formally.
However, in reply to logicism and formalism, Poincaré argues that it is impossible to
prove the consistency of arithmetic without using mathematical induction or its equi-
valent (Poincaré 1902a, 1920). Therefore, while one can eliminate metric geometry
by taking all of geometry to really concern numbers plus some group theoretic or
topological primitives that are non-metric, one cannot eliminate arithmetic and our
intuitive knowledge of mathematical induction. In a second argument presented on
the following page, Poincaré repeats his claim that geometric (i.e., metric) terms can
be “defined away,” while arithmetical ones cannot, arguing that whole number and
the principle of mathematical induction have equivalent definitions, but only in virtue
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of a synthetic a priori judgment, not on the basis of an explicit stipulative definition
(Poincaré 1920: 188–9; 1913: 469–70).
After reading Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry, Poincaré extended his strategy of
eliminating primitive terms in geometry. In a review of Hilbert (Poincaré 1902b) and
even more explicitly in the nomination that he wrote for the awarding of the third
Lobachevskii prize to Hilbert (Poincaré 1904), Poincaré argues that Lie’s work con-
tains an artificial limit: the study of continuous groups. Hilbert shows how to move
beyond this limit and thus overcome the idea that “group” is a primitive concept.
However, this simply moves the intuitive element back to a more abstract level, from
projective geometry to topology. Referring to Hilbert’s second group of axioms – the
axioms of order – Poincaré says:
The axioms of order are presented as dependant on projective axioms, and they would not
have any meaning if one did not allow the latter, since one would not know what three
points in a straight line is. And yet, there is a peculiar geometry which is purely qualita-
tive and which is absolutely independent of projective geometry, that does not presuppose
as known either the notion of a straight nor that of a plane but only the notions of line
and surface; it is what one calls topology. (Poincaré 1904: 8)
How are we to understand Poincaré’s arguments that metric geometry is a formal,
non-intuitive science, when at the same time he defends intuition in arithmetic? First,
Poincaré’s arguments for formalism in geometry and against formalism in arithmetic
both seem remarkably question begging. His view that we have no geometric intuition
seems to be equivalent to his acceptance of the consistency of non-Euclidean geometries
and his rejection of formalization of arithmetic seems to depend on his belief that the
principle of mathematical induction or its equivalent is fundamental to arithmetic in a
way that metric was not fundamental to geometry.
Given what Poincaré says about the meaning of primitive terms in geometry, it is
unclear how we can know in advance what an arithmetical system is. Negating the
parallel postulate obviously changed the metric properties of geometry – indeed, the
very idea of what a straight line is. Nevertheless, non-Euclidean geometries were
accepted. It seems compelling to say that we need mathematical induction to show
that arithmetic is consistent and that everyone accepts consistency as a requirement.
However, the consistency of Bolyai-Lobachevskii was only gained by removing metric
properties from what counts as geometry. Why could not the same argument be made
in arithmetic?
A second problem for Poincaré and for rationalists generally is how to maintain a
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable forms of intuition. For example, what
do we say about the axioms of topology? Or the continuum? We could say (a) that
there is no geometric intuition, and that “analytic geometry” is fundamentally arith-
metical, rather than geometric. This interpretation fits the early passages quoted above.
Or, we could say (b) that there is a limited form of geometric intuition, the analytical
or qualitative part. This second interpretation fits the later passages that I have cited
and also Poincaré’s remarks on the intuition of the continuum and his rejection of the
arithmetization of the continuum (see Folina 1992: ch. 6). Under both interpretations,
however, Poincaré still has to claim that some intuition is completely bankrupt, while
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other intuition is a priori knowledge in a classically rationalist sense and thus true and
certain. Under interpretation (a), Poincaré can at least argue that while geometric
intuitions are problematic, arithmetic intuitions are not. Under (b), the problem is
amplified, since Poincaré must say that some geometric intuitions are reliable, while
other kinds of geometric intuition are not. A single neat classification of intuitions
would be preferable.
One of the most promising ways to understand Poincaré’s rejection of some forms of
intuition while maintaining other forms as necessary is to see his view as stemming
from a distinction between intellectual and sensual intuition.2 The neo-Kantians of the
end of the nineteenth century had given up Kant’s intuition as a form of sensibility,
but left a conceptual intuition of the categories of the understanding in place. Poincaré
seems to be firmly in this tradition, since he maintains that we can create geometry
without any representations at all:
The words, point, straight, and plane themselves should not cause any visual representa-
tion. They could arbitrarily designate objects of any nature, provided that one can estab-
lish a correspondence between these objects such that for all systems of two objects called
points there corresponds one, and only one, of the objects called straights . . . The reason-
ing ought to be able, according to [Hilbert], to lead to purely mechanical rules, and to do
geometry, it is sufficient to apply strictly the rules to the axioms, without knowing what
they mean. One will in this way be able to construct all of geometry, I would not exactly
say without understanding it at all, since one grasps the logical connection of the propo-
sitions, but at least without seeing anything. One could give the axioms to a reasoning
machine, for example the logical piano of Stanley Jevons, and one would see all of geo-
metry come out. (Poincaré 1904: 6–7)
Thus, Poincaré firmly rejects intuition as a visual representation of geometric objects.
However, he claims that we need some conceptual intuition in order to understand
mathematics, if only to understand what is explicitly in the axioms. Presumably, the
reason why Poincaré would reject the idea that Jevons’ logical piano could understand
geometry is that it does not have the necessary a priori intuition of topology and arith-
metic needed to do so.
A third and final problem with all Kantian and post-Kantian arguments for ration-
alism is that they are mostly negative: rationalists are only able to tell us that intuition
leading to synthetic a priori knowledge is necessary to understand mathematics and
science. Any attempt by Poincaré to argue that the mind has special intuitive capa-
cities must be suspect, because he definitely changed his view on what is taken as
primitive and intuitive. Originally, geometry is nothing but a group, but later it is even
less than that. Poincaré’s change of mind does not inspire confidence in intuition or in
claims about what can and cannot be known intuitively. Will he now say that it is a
topological concept that preexists in the mind? On the contrary, Poincaré even says
that some topological properties of space are conventional, as well as intuitive and
necessary; in particular, that the number of dimensions of space is conventional. How-
ever, he may be excused for such inconsistent views in this case, since the topological
invariance of dimension was not completely understood at the time. The first proof
was given by Brouwer in Dutch in 1911, one year before Poincaré’s death (see Johnson
1979, 1981).
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The Mathematical Tradition and Theoretical Science
It would certainly be uncontroversial to say that advances in mathematics were re-
peatedly responsible for tremendous progress in science. Archimedes solved practical
experimental problems with Euclidean geometry, Descartes’ invention of analytic geo-
metry allowed him to invent a new physics as well, and Newton and Leibniz dramati-
cally extended the mathematical methods available for science with their co-discovery
of the calculus. In the nineteenth century, Gauss, Riemann, and many others made
major contributions to extend the mathematical tools of physics. Fisher did the same
for biology in the twentieth century and, of course, there are more such examples. The
success of mathematics once again puts the burden of proof on the empiricist, who
must explain why mathematics works. As before, the empiricist is left with the strat-
egy of either arguing that mathematics is “formal” and does not tell us anything about
the world, or instead that it is empirical, but the burden of proof seems even higher
than it was in the case of thought experiments, since the use of mathematics cannot
be eliminated from science (Field 1980; Sober 1999).
It seems ironic that the development of Newtonian mechanics is frequently described
as a competition between English experimentalism and French analysis, thus echo-
ing in a scientific context the traditional British empiricist vs. continental rationalist
account of the philosophical debate. The development of Leibniz’s version of the calculus
by French mathematicians such as Pierre-Simon de Laplace and Joseph Lagrange put
French mathematics far ahead of English mathematics. The subsequent applications
of analytical methods not only to classical Newtonian mechanics but also to thermo-
dynamics, by Fourier, electromagnetism by Ampère, and light by Fresnel, were extra-
ordinarily successful. Poincaré, who is often said to be the last in this line of French
mathematical physicists, expresses the traditional divide between the British and con-
tinental scientific styles, but finds that the debate between those who see science as a
priori and those who see it is as experimental can be resolved by understanding some
elements of science as hypothetical:
The English teach mechanics as an experimental science; on the Continent it is taught
always more or less as a deductive and a priori science. The English are right, no
doubt . . . the difficulty is largely due to the fact that treatises on mechanics do not clearly
distinguish between what is experiment, what is mathematical reasoning, what is con-
vention, and what is hypothesis. (Poincaré 1982: 89)
We would likely now say that a highly mathematical science is “theoretical” instead
of a priori, which is indicative of the extent to which rationalism has been out of
favor. Of course, even with this change in terminology it would be an overstatement
to say that the French success at analysis led to their total neglect of empirical
science. For example, Ivor Grattan-Guinness (1984) has noted how much em-
phasis the French put on engineering. On the other side of the Channel, it seems
impossible to justify calling Newton an empiricist, even if he did say, famously, that
he will “frame no hypotheses.” Indeed, many have argued that the most philosophi-
cally appealing aspect of Newton’s methodology was his resistance to the extremes
of empiricism and rationalism (Stein 1990), expressed in the recognition of a need
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for both analysis and synthesis and for empirical experimentation (Hankins 1985:
20).
From Aristotle onwards, an analytic and synthetic method was distinguished in
natural philosophy. One can either start from first principles and show how phenom-
ena can be explained by them, or one can start with phenomena and infer fundamental
laws of nature. Modern science adopted a hypothetical method, justifying the first prin-
ciples or the existence of theoretical entities solely by their empirical adequacy. Thus,
the only test for the truth of a hypothetical law of nature or the existence of a theor-
etical entity is whether or not a theory is consistent with observation. According to
this contemporary view, there is never a need for a priori rational justification in
science. Hypotheses are first adopted provisionally without evidence, and subsequently
either accepted or rejected on the basis of empirical evidence. The hypothetical method
that Poincaré mentions became the mainstream in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century philosophy of science and in science itself, generally at the expense of
rationalism, since the theoretical elements of a scientific theory might be understood
without any appeal to rational intuition.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, conflicting philosophical interpretations
of the methodology of modern science can be seen as precipitating the rationalist–
empiricist debate. Even with substantial agreement that rationalism in science was
dead, a philosophical debate ensued over what follows from the evidence for hypo-
theses that we obtain empirically. So called “scientific realists” believe that we can
legitimately claim to know that theoretical entities exist and that scientific theories are
true, while “empiricists” or “instrumentalists” believe that theoretical entities are con-
venient fictions and that scientific theories are empirically adequate, but not true (or
known to be true). Although “empiricist” has become the preferred name for the philo-
sophical position that I am describing here, and “instrumentalism” is associated with a
view that has been widely repudiated, I will use the term “instrumentalist,” since both
scientific realists and instrumentalists are very likely to be empiricists in the sense of
the debate between rationalists and empiricists at issue in this volume. Indeed, scien-
tific realism and instrumentalism can each be seen as a rejection of rationalism in
science by means of showing that the success of science can be explained entirely by
reference to what is learned empirically. While scientific realists claim that when we
have the appropriate evidence, empirical data give us a legitimate claim to knowledge,
even if that knowledge is indirect, instrumentalists claim that theoretical claims in
science are never validated, empirically or by any other means. Both realists and
instrumentalists consider the former a priori elements of scientific knowledge to be
theoretical. Realists claim to show that all scientific knowledge is empirical, despite the
existence of theoretical elements in science for which there can be no direct empirical
evidence. Instrumentalists claim that empirical methods should strictly limit claims of
scientific knowledge to phenomena and that theoretical elements are dispensable. The
overwhelming majority of both scientific realists and instrumentalists reject rational-
ism, seeing no need for a priori synthetic claims in the sciences.
The theoretical aspects of science have not been so easy to dismiss, however. Indeed,
major figures in twentieth-century science, starting with Einstein, are known for their
theoretical work in science. While documenting the development of theoretical science,
especially in Germany, Jungnickel and McCormmach (1986) emphasize how recent
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our current conception of theoretical science really is and what a major part of science
it has become. Stephen Toulmin’s The Return to Cosmology (1982) does not claim that
theoretical science is new, but it does make a strong argument that there is far more
theoretical work in science now than before and that science must include elements
that are theoretical or even speculative. One striking feature of twentieth-century
philosophy of science is the extent to which the topics that it took up are precisely
those that had been considered a priori knowledge by Kant, such as geometry, space
and time, causality, and the principles violated by quantum mechanics. While philoso-
phers are not required to conclude that theoretical science is evidence for rationalism,
its centrality does show that much of science is not empirical in any straightforward
sense. Indeed, although synthetic a priori knowledge was officially rejected by the
Vienna Circle in the 1929 manifesto (see Neurath and Cohen 1974), statements about
the former Kantian a priori have often been given a special role, either as conventions,
or as the hard core of scientific theories. Quine’s critique of the analytic–synthetic
distinction was supposed to replace the notion of any special status for what was
formerly considered to be a priori with a thoroughgoing empirical holism, but several
authors have questioned Quine’s result (Creath 1991; Friedman 2001; Stein 1992;
Richardson 1997). Going beyond mere critique of Quine’s empiricism, some have even
advocated a return to a form of rationalism, giving some element of our knowledge a
special a priori status (De Pierris 1992; Friedman 2001).
The development of non-Euclidean geometries and especially of the General Theory
of Relativity made a profound impact on philosophy of science in the early twentieth
century by showing philosophers that the most fundamental aspects of physical theory
could change. Geometry, space and time, causality, and the fundamental principles of
physical theories were still seen to have a special role, even if Kant’s rationalism was
rejected. Mach and Poincaré took such elements of science to be conventions, a matter
of free choice, regardless of what experiment says. Slightly different versions of con-
ventionalism were developed by C. I. Lewis, Victor Lentzen, Arthur Pap, and Russell
Norwood Hanson. Ian Hacking (1992) has advocated something similar to conven-
tionalism with his notion of “styles of reasoning.” Many of these treatments of a priori
knowledge share the idea that what Kant took to be necessary can and indeed has
changed through the development of scientific theories.
Conceptual change of this sort is what many postpositivist philosophers of science,
such as Kuhn, Toulmin, Laudan, and Shapere, saw as a fundamentally important
aspect of science. Indeed, Kuhn (1990) eventually (and tentatively) picked up the idea
of a conventional treatment of synthetic a priori knowledge as an explication of his
views. The idea that there are revisable conventions at the heart of science was
already well developed prior to logical positivism, continued in logical positivism itself,
and was maintained even in postpositivist philosophy of science. While Quine admits
that some elements of empirical theory are much less likely to be revised than others,
he underestimates the asymmetric relations between the “hard core” and the “peri-
phery.” It is not just that the “periphery” is more likely to be revised than the “hard
core,” but rather that the statements of the “periphery” cannot even be stated, let
alone tested, without the “hard core” functioning in the Kantian sense as a necessary
precondition. It is possible that fundamental elements of science will be a priori in
a functional sense, given that they must be chosen prior to proceeding with any
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theoretical or empirical work, and that these elements can be justified neither by rational
intuition, nor by empirical test (Stump 2003). If they remain untestable empirically,
and cannot be justified by rational intuition, there will be a component of scientific
theory that falls outside of the range of the options provided by traditional philoso-
phical rationalism and empiricism.
Notes
1 The “reasoning machine” to which Poincaré refers is Stanley Jevons’ “logical piano,” the
logic of which is equivalent to Venn diagrams. Jevons demonstrated his machine in 1866
( Jevons, 1869: 59– 60; 1958: 170ff.). The machine was conceived as a “logical abacus,” a
set of blocks representing subject, predicate, and middle terms. With the addition of levers
to move the blocks, Jevons developed a sort of logical adding machine (see Gardner 1982:
ch. 5).
2 Michael Detlefsen suggested such a distinction in his talk at the 1994 Poincaré Congress in
Nancy, France. If the distinction can be maintained, we can credit Poincaré with having at
least one clear way of distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable uses of intuition.
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